Redistributing Educational Attainment: Evidence from an Unusual Policy Experiment in India by Joydeep Roy
The Impact of Lowering of Academic Standards on Educational
Outcomes: Evidence from An Unusual Policy in India∗
Joydeep Roy†
Economic Policy Institute & Georgetown University
Abstract
In 1983 the Indian state of West Bengal abolished the teaching of English at the primary
level from public schools, narrowing the curriculum to the other subjects then taught. The
objective of this intervention - a lowering of the existing academic standards - was to make
primary education more accessible, particularly for poorer and rural children, who at that
time had low enrollment and high dropout rates. Using two large data sets from India and a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy, I investigate the eﬀect of this unusual policy on educational
outcomes in West Bengal. I ﬁnd that there was a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect of the policy on
subsequent educational attainment, and that this was larger for children from poorer families.
However, there was simultaneously a large increase in expenditure on private tutoring. This
suggests that families who could aﬀord to do so were supplementing the skills of their children
by private purchases, since in a multilingual country like India, a knowledge of a common lan-
guage like English has signiﬁcant beneﬁts later in life, both in the labor market and otherwise.
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In 1983 the Indian state of West Bengal abolished the teaching of English at the primary level from
public schools.1 Till that time, all primary students in West Bengal had to learn two languages
from grade 1 - Bengali, the vernacular, and English. The objective of this reform was to make
education more accessible to poorer and rural children, who at that time had low enrollment
and high dropout rates. English would henceforth be taught only from grade 6. In this paper I
investigate how this abolition of English aﬀected educational outcomes in West Bengal.
The abolition of English was looked upon as a lowering of educational standards, since the
resultant narrowing of the curriculum was expected to enable students and parents to divert the
same amount of resources to learning fewer subjects. It was expected that schooling outcomes like
enrollment and years of schooling would improve as a result. On the other hand, the policy likely
negatively impacted English language skills, which many employers consider important. Since
prospective employers knew which cohorts learned English from grade 1 and which did not, the
returns to schooling were also presumably lower.
The no-English policy was designed and adopted when the Left Front - an alliance of mostly
communist parties and other left-leaning parties - was in power. The political base of the commu-
nists was largely concentrated in the rural areas and among the disadvantaged populations and
an urge to improve the state of their education underlay the implementation of this particular
policy. For example, Jasodhara Bagchi, a prominent left-leaning intellectual, argued in 1981 that
“the burden of the failure so far (in educational attainment) has to be shouldered by a system
of education which teaches English at every stage”, referring to the pervasive high dropout rates
in the primary level at that time, and she urged the government to do away with English at the
primary level (Bagchi, 1981).2
1 Primary level typically encompasses grades 1-5 in India.
2 It has also been alleged that another important reason behind the policy was ideological - a strongly-ingrained
belief that “a knowledge in English will entitle one with a privileged and exclusive status”, something the Marxists
ﬁnd abhorrent (quoted from Guha Thakurta, 1998). It is instructive to note here some recent scholarship regarding
the design and execution of education policy in the British-ruled colonial period in India and Bengal. It has been
argued that the “native elites”, composed of the upper classes and castes, were so organized and powerful that
they were able to divert the direction of this policy to the detriment of the larger sections of the Indian population.
For example, Acharya (1998) discusses how the Bengali middle class was able to subvert the policies of the British
colonial administration so that most of the limited funds available was spent on “subsidizing English education
1Assuming that the abolition of English was a lowering of academic standards one would expect
the following to happen, as far as educational outcomes are concerned. First, we might expect
an increase in school enrollment. Students and parents, who previously shunned schools for fear
of being unable to cope up, are more likely to join now. Second, for the same reason, we might
expect to see an increase in the number of years of education in the population.
However, faced with the prospect of a decline in job market opportunities, those who can
aﬀord them could switch to private schools, which were not constrained by the no-English rule,
or arrange for private tutoring at home.3 That is, these households could supplement the English
language skills of their children by private purchases. In this case, particularly if there is a transfer
of students from public to private schools, there might be some adverse eﬀects on those remaining
in public schools, if the students who transfer are also the ones who are higher performing and
more motivated. These adverse peer eﬀects, combined with any adverse teacher eﬀects due to a
similar transfer of better teachers, may dampen any positive eﬀects on educational attainment
the abolition might otherwise have had. It might also increase the gap in English language skills
(and presumably, future wages and earnings) between children whose families can aﬀord private
purchases and children whose families cannot aﬀord to do so.
In fact, some prominent Bengali economists dissented to the abolition of teaching of English
because of this possibility of segregation, while arguing against wanton experimentation with the
education of children. For example, Bhabatosh Datta wrote, “if English does scare children,
so should arithmetic”, and went on to argue that “knowledge of English is bound to remain
at a premium for a long time and it will be unfortunate if this premium is enjoyed only by a
very select group.... The only result of such a course (abolition of English) will be that there
will be a mushrooming growth of private English-teaching schools and coaching classes. The
reported government decision will not eliminate English at the primary stage. It will only conﬁne
the teaching of English to the well-to-do and encourage the growth of private commerce in the
teaching of the subject” (Datta, 1981).
Some suggestive evidence as to the desirability of a good knowledge of English in a multilingual
for the bhadralok (upper class and upper middle class families)” rather than educating the poorer classes. The
no-English policy of the Left Front can be seen as an extreme reaction to what they may have considered such
persistent “elitism”.
3 In many parts of India, it is common for parents to supplement the education that their kids get from school
by arranging for extra coaching at home - this private coaching is often called private tuition or private tutoring.
2country like India can be had from examining the enrollments in English-medium schools.4 In
West Bengal and the other ﬁve states that will form the basis of my subsequent investigations,
the percentages of primary-grade children attending English-medium schools are given in Table
1. A steep gradient with respect to household income is immediately discernible - children from
higher-income households attend English-medium schools at much higher rates than those from
lower-income households. In none of these states is English the mother tongue or vernacular.5
I investigate the eﬀect of this policy on educational outcomes in West Bengal. Using two large
data sets from India and a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy, I examine whether the abolition led to
any improvements in school outcomes at the primary stage, particularly among rural and poorer
students. I also analyze whether there were transfers to private schools and/or increased hiring
of private tutors by families with children, possibly to oﬀset the decline in English language skills
due to the abolition.
I do not ﬁnd any positive eﬀect of the program on school enrollment, in either the rural
sector or the urban,- however, there was a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on school attainment,
as measured by the number of years of schooling. Moreover, this improvement was relatively
larger for children from poorer families. However, there has also been a signiﬁcant increase in
expenditures on private coaching - many more households in West Bengal were supplementing the
education of their children by hiring private tutors. These suggest that those who could aﬀord
to do so were supplementing the skills of their children by private purchases, most probably a
consequence of the fact that a knowledge of English had signiﬁcant beneﬁts later in life.
It is interesting to note here that the abolition of English from primary schools in West Bengal
was short-lived. In the face of widespread public dissatisfaction, the Left Front government was
forced to backtrack on its English teaching policy in the late 1990’s. First, a commission set up in
1998 recommended the teaching of English from an earlier stage, and the government reintroduced
English from grade 3 in 1999. Next, a report by the U.S. consultancy ﬁrm McKinsey & Company
on industrial prospects in West Bengal noted that the state was poor at creating a pool of people
4 An English-medium school is one where the medium (language) of instruction is English.
5 Note also that the future payoﬀs need not be conﬁned to higher wages in the labor market. Speaking of
education in general, Sen (1999) writes,“even with the same level of income, a person may beneﬁt from education -
in reading, communicating, arguing, in being able to choose in a more informed way, in being taken more seriously
by others and so on. The beneﬁts of education, thus, exceed its role as human capital in commodity production.”
It is conceivable that many of these non-pecuniary beneﬁts are relevant to a knowledge of English too.
3proﬁcient in spoken English, which was a crucial disadvantage for the sunrise industries like those
in the IT sector the state was trying to promote and develop (Mitra, 2002). Though subsequently a
committee appointed by the state government to advise on issues of K-12 education recommended
a return to the earlier no-English policy (Anandabazar Patrika, 2003), the government decided in
favor of reinstating English from grade 1 itself and this was implemented in the 2004-05 academic
year.
This study is related to two strands of literature. The ﬁrst strand analyzes eﬀorts to improve
educational outcomes in developing countries. Duﬂo (2001) ﬁnds that a large school construction
project in Indonesia, where the government built more than 60,000 primary schools throughout
the country between 1973 and 1978, led to a signiﬁcant increase in educational attainment of
aﬀected children. Ravallion and Wodon (2000) analyze the eﬀect of a targeted enrollment subsidy
in rural Bangladesh and show that it increased schooling among children, by far more than it
reduced child labor. Banerjee et al (2007) argue that two experiments conducted in urban slums
in Mumbai and Vadodara, India, - a remedial education program where young women from the
community were hired to teach basic literacy and numeracy skills to children and a computer-
assisted learning program providing each child with two hours of shared computer time per week
- were both very eﬀective, and look promising as policy tools. Kremer (2003) reviews recent
randomized evaluations of educational programs in developing countries and discusses lessons for
education policy. My study, looking at an unusual policy experiment in India, provides important
evidence regarding its eﬀectiveness and lessons for similar policies, highlighting both the intended
and unintended consequences.
The second strand of literature that this paper is related to analyzes policies relating to
language skills of individuals. Though there have been many studies in the ﬁeld of labor economics
that relate to language skills of individuals, almost all of them are concerned with the labor market
implications. In my case, I am mostly concerned with the eﬀect of the policy on educational
outcomes.6 In the process this paper provides evidence on the eﬀects of a policy intervention that
seeks to boost educational attainment by changing curriculum and standards.
6 In future work it would be interesting to analyze the eﬀects of the no-English policy on labor market outcomes
of the aﬀected cohorts. However, even the ﬁrst cohorts aﬀected by the abolition were only in their early ’20s in
2004, the latest year for which comprehensive all-India employment and earnings data (NSS 60th round; see section
4 for details about NSS surveys) are available. This precludes an analysis of labor market eﬀects at current time.
4This paper is most closely related to Angrist and Lavy (1997), who look at the labor market
eﬀects of a similar policy - the abolition of teaching in French from the secondary level in Morocco.
Beginning in 1983, the medium of instruction for new cohorts of Moroccan sixth graders was
switched to Arabic. Angrist and Lavy ﬁnd that the policy has led to a substantial lowering of
wages and earnings in the labor market. Unlike this study, however, Angrist and Lavy do not
focus on educational outcomes, though they note a decline in French language skills of the aﬀected
cohorts.
The policy change in Morocco was similar to the one implemented in West Bengal. However,
unlike in Morocco, students from West Bengal participate in a labor market that spans across
several Indian states, if not nationwide, and hence have to compete with students from these
other states, which did not have a similar no-English policy. In addition, these students who
are aﬀected by the abolition also have to compete with older workers from West Bengal, who
learnt English from grade 1 and were presumably better-skilled in that language. This would lead
to strong incentives for people to supplement their skills by private purchases if these skills are
valued in the labor market. In this case, depending on the availability and aﬀordability of private
schools and of private tutoring outside of school, the fall in skills in the relevant language may
be relatively muted. When I look at West Bengal after the abolition of English, this mechanism
seems to have played an important role.
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. In section 2, I analyze some possible eﬀects of
the abolition of English in a simple theoretical framework. Section 3 describes the diﬀerent data
sets used in the estimation. In Section 4 I describe how I identify the program eﬀects. Section 5
discusses the results. Section 6 concludes. In an appendix I discuss whether the existence of an
all-India program called Operation Blackboard may have biased some of my results. References,
tables and ﬁgures follow.
2 Theoretical Framework
This section presents a simple theoretical framework to analyze the eﬀects of educational stan-
dards. I begin with a slightly modiﬁed version of Costrell’s (1994) model to show how a change in
standards will have diﬀerent eﬀects on diﬀerent students. Next I allow individual families to sup-
plement their children’s education by private purchases (private schools and/or private coaching)
5and look at how such expenditures may be aﬀected by a change in standards.
Eﬀect of Educational Standards
Consider an economy populated by a continuum of students, each with a given inherent ability.
However, inherent ability is unobserved - employers can only observe whether a student has
completed the prevailing educational standard or not. Thus a student’s future wage depends on
her meeting the standard. The standard is set by policymakers, and utility-maximizing students
(or their parents) choose whether to meet the standard or not. (In our case we can think of the
standard as primary schooling. Note that the assumption of a single standard is for simplicity
only, there can be multiple additional standards like middle or secondary schooling, post-secondary
education, etc.)
The utility function of the student is given by Ui = Ui(Li,wi), where wi denotes future
earnings (or productivity), determined by educational attainment ei, and Li denotes leisure.7
Deﬁne student i’s educational production function as ei= ei(Li), where educational attainment
ei is a concave, decreasing function of student leisure. Let L0 be the maximum amount of leisure,
and e0 = ei(L0) be the zero-eﬀort level of educational attainment.8 In what follows, I sometimes
use the inverse production function, Li = li(ei).
In a world with perfect information, employers could distinguish individual productivity and
pay the corresponding wages. Each student would pick up a point on his production function,
depending on his preferences. The resulting equilibrium for a representative student is shown in
Figure 1 - at equilibrium, she would choose an education level of e∗
i and get the corresponding
wage, wi = e∗
i. With an education standard, however, the system is eﬀectively pass-fail - and the
student’s wage-leisure constraint becomes a step function as follows. (In this simple model, where
employers cannot see true ability and only know whether the standard has been met, additional
education beyond the standard is not rewarded. So no graduate has any incentive to do more
than what is needed to graduate. Similarly for the non-graduates. This assumption is made
for simplicity only, relaxing it does not change any of the main results.) The standard is the
7 For simplicity we assume that wages equal educational attainment, i.e. wi = ei. Also, for developing countries
like India we should broadly interpret Li as the opportunity cost of schooling, be it in terms of child labor or
household labor or just leisure. Of course, some direct costs of schooling - like buying books, uniform, etc. - might
also be important.
8 For simplicity e0 is assumed to be greater than zero and to be the same for all i. This implies that the education
production function faced by the student - see below and Figure 1 - is concave till L0 and vertical thereafter.
6education level required to graduate, say b e. In equilibrium, the education level of the graduates
will be equal to the standard, b e and this will be their wage. Similarly, the non-graduates have an
education level of e0 each, and this will be their wage. ( b Li, b e) and (L0,e0) are the only points
among which the student will choose, and she chooses the one on the higher indiﬀerence curve. In
Figure 2, the student depicted meets the standard. It is below e e, the maximum standard that the
student will meet, given by Ui(li(e e), e e) = Ui(L0,e0). (Meeting any standard higher than e e yields a
utility strictly lower than dropping out, so the student will not graduate.) Her preferred standard
though is e∗
i.
To examine the eﬀects of a lowering of academic standards in this framework, suppose that
the initial standard was b einitial, and that it has now been lowered to b efinal. Then the following
happens.
i) First, it is evident from Figure 3 that those students who were meeting the standard would
continue to do so, since their e e’s, which were already above b einitial, would be above b efinal. Thus
there are no discouraged dropouts. But most of them will suﬀer a fall in utility.
ii) However, some students who were not meeting the standard earlier would do so now, as the
standard can be met through a lower eﬀort, see Figure 4. Since they meet the standard only if it
falls in the range marked ab in Figure 4, their utility goes up.
iii) There is no change in the utility of those students who were neither meeting the standard
earlier, and nor do now. These students have a suﬃciently high opportunity cost of schooling,
and even a somewhat lower standard may not be enough to make them meet the standard.
Though simple and stylized, the above discussion makes clear that the gains from a fall in
standard accrue to those students who had not been meeting the standard earlier but now do,
as their wages go up. Conversely, students who had already been meeting the standard are now
worse oﬀ, since their wages (which depends on their educational attainment, in turn determined
by the existing standard) go down.9
To formalize this, consider a simple Cobb-Douglas form for the utility function. The exponent
α denotes the relative weight on future wages and earnings vis-a-vis current opportunity costs
9 This also illustrates the sense in which a policy of lowering the standards can be considered redistributive,
more likely to be undertaken by populist or left-wing governments. These governments might put more weight
on the income gains of the lower ability individuals, compared to income losses for people at the top, and hence
acquiesce in a lower standard. As mentioned earlier, the policy was undertaken when a coalition of communist and
leftist-leaning parties, called the Left Front, was in power in West Bengal.
7(or leisure). Also, for simplicity, I assume that the form of the educational production function
is the same for all students. What diﬀers across students is the value of α, students with greater
preference for leisure or higher costs of schooling (both direct and opportunity costs) have higher
values of α. Under perfect information, a representative student solves




i subject to Li = li(ei)
The ﬁrst-order condition (FOC), with respect to ei, for this maximization problem is αi.ei.li
′(ei)+








so that students with higher αi’s choose lesser amounts of schooling, and vice versa.
Under imperfect information, the choice facing students is only between ( b Li, b e) and (L0,e0).
In this case, if a student αs chooses to meet the standard, then all students with αi below αs
choose to meet it. On the other hand if a student αt chooses not to meet the standard, all students
with αi above αt choose not to meet it. This follows from the fact that if Ui( b Li,b e) > Ui(L0,e0) for
a student with αs - so that she meets the standard - then Ui( b Li,b e) > Ui(L0,e0) for all students
with αi below αs, and they all meet the standard. And conversely.
However, one important element is missing from the above discussion. This is the possibility of
private provision of schooling. Suppose that students or their families have some resources at their
disposal and can decide whether to spend part of these resources to join a private school instead
of a public one. Public schools are free, but private ones charge a tuition fee,- also private schools,
which are not directly controlled by policymakers, are not aﬀected by the change in standards.
Prospective employers can observe the type of school one has been to. To see what might happen,
note that after a reduction in standards, which is binding on the public schools, students in these
schools suﬀer a decline in utility (see Figure 3). This is because for these students, who were
already graduating under the earlier more rigorous standard, the reduction in standards aﬀects
their educational attainment and hence their wages. If this decline in utility is greater than the
utility loss from tuition costs of private schools, then they would switch to private schools, where
standards have not changed. Applying the intuition of the above discussion to this context implies
that there will be stratiﬁcation, in that the students left in public schools will be the ones with
higher costs of schooling. That is, after a lowering of standards, if a student with a value of αj
switches to private school, then all students with αi lower than αj will also switch. Conversely, if
8a student with αp remains in the public school, all students with αi higher than αp will also do
so.
Household Expenditures on Private Coaching (Tutoring) in Education
Next I relax the assumptions of the model that inherent ability of a person, proxied by his or
her level of schooling skills (education), is completely unobserved and that employers only get to
see whether a student has completed the standard or not. Instead I assume that employers get
a (noisy) signal about prospective employee’s true educational attainment. I also assume that
the level of skills or education can be increased by private purchases,10 and that a higher level of
education monotonically increases the chances of providing a better signal in the job market.11 In
other words, passing the standard is still important,- however, a person can increase his chances
of providing a better signal, and thereby getting a better job and/or higher wages, by acquiring
more education. One way to acquire these skills (or higher education), that are demanded by
potential employers, is by private purchases as mentioned.
To model the eﬀect of a change in educational standards in this framework, consider a family
that is deciding how to allocate its income (resources) V between buying private coaching for
the child (Xe) and all other goods (XH), and how to allocate its time between schooling and
leisure.12 For simplicity, assume that the child currently attends a public school where she gets
an education worth b e, and that this schooling is free. That is, the current educational standard
is set at b e. The expenditure on private coaching serves to enhance the education level or skills
of the child by δ(Xe), where δ is an increasing, twice diﬀerentiable and concave function.13 The
price of private coaching is p. Total educational attainment, or the actual level of skills, is given
by b e+δ(Xe).
10 By private purchases I refer to expenditures on schooling-related activities other than attending a public school.
These activities may include attending a private school and/or hiring tutors who teach children outside of regular
school. The latter is known as private coaching or private tuition in India.
11 Formally, I assume that the function relating the job market signal to schooling skills or education satisﬁes the
Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property - given a higher signal, the probability that it is coming from someone who
has higher education is larger than the probability that it is coming from someone with lower education.
12 In this model, transferring to a private school and buying private coaching are exactly analogous - both involve
sacriﬁces in terms of money (foregone consumption of other goods) and both increase the level of skills of the child
in question. For simplicity the following analysis assumes that Xe refers to private coaching.
13 The function δ determines how a unit of private coaching translates into a unit of schooling skills. This is
assumed to satisfy the usual regularity conditions that ensure an interior maximum.
9The household’s problem is to maximize its utility function U(e,L,XH), where e is the total
of schooling skills acquired by the child. The utility function is assumed to be increasing and
concave in its arguments. I consider a representative household here, so to save notation I do not
index utility by i. Formally, the family chooses Xe, L and XH to solve14
Max U(e,L,XH) subject to V = XH + p.Xe
L = l(b e + δ(Xe))
e = b e + δ(Xe)
Since I want to study the eﬀect of a change in education standards on private purchases of
educational services, I will focus on the choice of Xe. Substituting the constraints in the utility
function, the maximixation problem can be re-written as:
Max U(b e + δ(Xe),l(b e + δ(Xe)),V − p.Xe)













This is the familiar marginal beneﬁt equals marginal cost result - the household increases
spending on private coaching to the point where the marginal beneﬁt from another unit equals
the opportunity cost. The second order condition will be satisﬁed if |l
′′
| is not very large (and the
cross-partial terms of the utility function are not too large).
I am interested here in the comparative statics exercises of a change in the prevailing educa-
tional standard, b e. Totally diﬀerentiating the FOC and making use of the second-order condition
yields dXe
db e < 0.15 Thus, if the educational standard at the public school is lowered, parents will
supplement their kids’ education through private coaching. Of course, they may also shift to a
private school where a similar lowering of standards has not taken place. In either case there will
14 In this speciﬁcation, we assume that the uncertainty is about the level of overall education. We can alternately
assume that employers can always see for sure whether the standard has been met, the uncertainty only relates to
the amount of additional education. The results are similar, so for simplicity we stick to this speciﬁcation.
15 The above exercise assumes that the maximization problem has an interior solution both before and after the
change in the educational standard, implying families were incurring positive expenditures on coaching both before
and after the change. However, it is easy to see that there will be some families who were not buying any private
coaching before the reduction in standards (corner solution), but do so afterwards.
10be an increase in the amount of resources spent on the child, and a reduction in spending on other
goods XH.
To sum, the results in this section show that ceteris paribus, a lowering of educational standards
- such as the abolition of teaching of English which narrows the curriculum - will be expected to
increase overall educational attainment. This is because some students who were dropping out
earlier would graduate now (see Figure 4), leading to an increase in the average number of years of
schooling attained. However, since this schooling might be worth less now because of a reduction
in standards (lower English language skills in the case of West Bengal), there might be an exodus
of students to private schools, accompanied by an increase in private coaching.
3 Data
I use data from multiple sources. The main source of data is surveys conducted by the National
Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) in India. The NSSO conducts the National Sample Survey
(NSS), which is a nation-wide, large-scale, continuous survey operation conducted in the form of
successive rounds. The NSS surveys are the primary and most reliable source of information on
several important indicators in India, particularly those relating to households and individuals
like consumption, poverty, employment and educational attainment. For my primary analysis I
use data from the two education rounds of the NSS surveys - the 42nd round and the 52nd round.
The 42nd round was canvassed from July 1986 to June 1987, and the 52nd round from July 1995
to June 1996. These are large household and individual-level survey datasets, covering all states
and regions of India. These surveys contain detailed information both at the household level
and at the individual level, including data on household composition, income and expenditure,
educational attainment, etc. Since the 42nd round survey was canvassed in 1986-87 and the 52nd
round in 1995-96 and both surveys include detailed information on various aspects of schooling of
children from various ages, using both of these surveys allows me to estimate the program eﬀects
while controlling for pre-program diﬀerences, if any. Note that the ﬁrst cohort aﬀected by the
policy is the one that was in grade 1 in 1983, but the full eﬀects might be evident only after a
few years.
The data on price indices are drawn from various sources. The adjustments for inter-state
price diﬀerences follow the numbers given in Deaton and Tarozzi (2005). Deaton and Tarozzi
11use the 43rd and 50th expenditure rounds of the NSS surveys to calculate not only the weights
used in the price indices, but also to calculate the prices (or unit values) themselves based on the
information on expenditures. Some of the data on price indices also come from this study. For
the remaining data I use a couple of sources - the World Bank Database on Poverty and Growth
in India (1996), which contains detailed statistics on a wide range of topics in India, and the press
releases of the Government of India, Press Information Bureau.
4 Identiﬁcation and Estimation Strategy
4.1 Identifying the Program Eﬀects
Like most developing regions, education in the early ’80s in West Bengal (and other Indian
states) was in a state of ﬂux. Most schooling variables, including enrollment and number of
years of schooling, were trending upwards. In order to avoid spuriously attributing to the no-
English policy eﬀects that were instead secular in nature, or at least common to all the states, my
empirical strategy focuses on diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation. That is, I compare the evolution
of various schooling indicators in West Bengal (enrollment, number of years of schooling, private
school attendance and expenditure on private coaching) in the post-program period with those
in other (similar) Indian states during the same period, after controlling for any pre-program
diﬀerences.
To do this, I begin by ﬁnding Indian states that were either i) similar to West Bengal in
the early 1980s with respect to schooling indicator and/or ii) had diﬀerences that were relatively
stable for the period prior to 1983, when the no-English policy was implemented in West Bengal.
This group of states will serve as the control group for West Bengal once I take out the initial
diﬀerence, if any.
To implement the above strategy empirically, I look at school enrollment for children from
the 42nd round who were not aﬀected by the policy. Children who were more than 12 years old
during the 42nd round of the NSS survey, which was canvassed between July 1986 and June 1987,
would have attended grade 1 much before 1983 and hence would be unaﬀected by the no-English
policy. I take all children aged between 12 and 18 years at the time of the survey and divide
12them into groups based on their age - each age-group is considered a cohort.16 I compare school
enrollment for these age-groups in West Bengal with those in other Indian states - looking at the
experience of successive age cohorts will show the trends in schooling outcomes prior to 1983 and
whether these trends were similar or diﬀerent in various states compared to West Bengal. The
states for which the diﬀerences from West Bengal are either negligible or stable over the three
cohorts constitute my control group. That is, the states for which the levels and trends in school
enrollment are similar to those in West Bengal, for the period just before the no-English policy
was enacted in West Bengal, can be considered as being on the same trajectory as West Bengal
and hence constitute the appropriate comparison group for evaluating the eﬀect of the no-English
policy.
Formally, I run the following regression for each age-cohort
yijs = α + β.xijs + γ.zjs + δs.θs + εijs ....(1)
Here yijs refers to school enrollment of the ith child in the jth household in the sth state.
xijs are the individual controls, which include age, sex, a dummy for the child being brother or
sister of the head of the household, and a dummy for the child being the grandchild of the head
of the household. (The last two variables are included to control for the fact that educational
outcomes may diﬀer depending on the relationship of the child to the head of the household,
as some previous literature suggests that distribution of household resources may depend on the
relationship of children to household head.) zjs are the household-level variables, and include
per capita household expenditure, per capita household expenditure squared, sex of head of the
household, dummies for diﬀerent categories of parental education and dummies for belonging to
the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.17
16 Since many researchers have expressed concern that age may not always be correctly reported in these household
surveys, I have tried to smooth over reported ages by considering age-groups with multiple-year bands viz. 12-
13, 14-16 and 17-18. (I have considered 14-16 as a separate age-group as age-heaping - the phenomenon where
respondents’ reported ages are found to be clustered around particular numbers - is pervasive for ages ending in
5 in Indian surveys.) I also repeated the analysis with alternate classiﬁcation of age groups - 12-14 and 15-18. In
the text I only show the results for the former group, - the results for the second group are similar and hence not
reported.
17 In India certain segments of the population are designated as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. These
groups have traditionally been discriminated against by other better-oﬀ groups and constitute the most disad-
vantaged sections of the population. The educational attainment of children belonging to Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes typically lag behind that of other children - I include dummies to control for any eﬀect stemming
from belonging to these groups.
13θs refers to the state dummies for the diﬀerent states in India. I exclude the smaller states and
am left with 17 larger ones. These 17 states are Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana,
Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra,
Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal. The omitted states
(and union territories) are Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland,
Sikkim, Tripura, Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Chandigarh, Dadra & Nagar Haveli, Daman &
Diu, Delhi, Lakshadweep and Pondicherry. These are either small union territories administered
directly by the government of India, or relatively sparsely populated states, many concentrated in
northeast India,- these states are not directly comparable to West Bengal or the other 16 bigger
states.
As mentioned earlier, the dependent variable relates to school enrollment - it is a binary (0-1)
indicator for whether the child ever enrolled in a school. The regression is also run separately for
girls, as several of the individual and household variables may aﬀect girls diﬀerently. Since the
program began in 1983 (students in ﬁrst grade in 1983 were the ﬁrst to be aﬀected), someone
who was under 12 years at the time of the 42nd round (1986-87) might potentially be aﬀected.
(Children in India often enter school quite late, sometimes as late as in age 8.) So I restrict
attention to the age-groups who would have been in grade 1 immediately preceding the program.
Equation (1) is run separately for the urban and rural sectors and separately for each of the
three age cohorts. West Bengal is the omitted category. The standard errors reported are robust
to heteroscedasticity and take account of the clustering in the survey design. For each regression,
I note the signiﬁcance or otherwise of the other state dummies - the candidate states are those
that either satisfy (i) insigniﬁcant values of δs for each of the three cohorts, or (ii) signiﬁcant but
stable values of δs over the three cohorts. I ﬁnd that the following ﬁve states were most similar
to West Bengal - Assam, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka and Orissa.
The results for these ﬁve states are in Table 2. (The complete set of results for all 16 states,
including these ﬁve, are available on request.) For the urban regions, all of these ﬁve states –
Assam, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka and Orissa – have generally insigniﬁcant diﬀerences with
West Bengal. The result holds for both overall enrollment (meaning both sexes included) and
female enrollment, and it holds for all the 3 age cohorts considered. As for the rural sector,
compared to both Assam and Gujarat, overall enrollment in West Bengal is signiﬁcantly lower,
but the diﬀerences over successive cohorts are similar in magnitude. The diﬀerences with the
14other states are either small or only signiﬁcant for one particular age-group.
In other words, among the other 16 major states of India, these ﬁve are the ones that were
similar to West Bengal at the time it abolished English from its primary schools. Table 3 summa-
rizes the values of some important socioeconomic indicators for these states vis-a-vis West Bengal.
As is evident, West Bengal is similar to these states in terms of these indicators too, suggesting
that unobserved diﬀerences across states, which might have diﬀerentially aﬀected the evolution
of schooling indicators over time, are unlikely to be large and signiﬁcant. For example, mean per
capita expenditures in West Bengal are close to most of these states (though Haryana is slightly
richer), while the percentage of disadvantaged households and the percentage of households with
literate parents are also quite similar. Note that West Bengal has consistently ranked 8th in the
nation in terms of Human Development Index - a summary measure computed by the Planning
Commission of India which looks at eight diﬀerent aspects of development performance - while
the ﬁve states in my control group occupy ranks close to West Bengal (on either side).
A couple of other points should be noted here. It might be argued that some of the program
eﬀects that I ﬁnd later might stem not from the abolition of English but other similar programs
in West Bengal.18 There were no other important educational policy change at the primary and
secondary level in West Bengal around this time, but there were two other programs implemented
by the Left Front - the land reforms program (operation barga) and the devolution of power
to village-level councils (panchayati raj). However, it is unlikely that a general land reforms
program (most of whose eﬀects would be expected to come through a rise in incomes, which I
control for in the regressions) or a change in local governance structure would have ﬁrst-order
eﬀects on schooling outcomes. This is particularly so as public schools in West Bengal (and
India) are neither locally-ﬁnanced nor locally-operated, but rather ﬁnanced and run by the state
government. Note that both the land reforms and panchayati raj programs aﬀected mostly the
rural regions, while the abolition of English was a statewide aﬀair, aﬀecting urban areas also. The
timing of these programs was also somewhat diﬀerent. In particular, the land reform program
aﬀected diﬀerent regions and districts at diﬀerent points in time, a fact utilized by Banerjee,
18 I am not aware of any signiﬁcant educational policy change around this time in any of the states constituting
my control group. Also, since there are 5 states in my control group, spread across diﬀerent regions of India, it is
highly unlikely that some policy, educational or otherwise, implemented in a single state would signiﬁcantly bias the
results. Further, binary comparisons between West Bengal and each of the individual states in my control group,
not reported here, yielded very similar results.
15Gertler and Ghatak (2002) in their study of the program. This is in contrast to the abolition of
teaching in English, which aﬀected all schools in the state simultaneously.19 Finally, note that
even though the Left Front was ﬁrst elected in 1977, the abolition of English came after it had been
in power for six years, in its second term in power. So my analysis is unlikely to be contaminated
by eﬀects due to a change in party control of the state government in West Bengal.
However, there was an all-India program called Operation Blackboard initiated towards the
end of the 1980s, which targeted primary-school going children and aimed at improvements in
school quality. In an appendix I discuss whether the existence of this program can have contam-
inated some of the interpretations of my results.
4.2 Empirical Strategy
Using data from the 42nd and 52nd rounds of the NSS, I estimate the following regression
yijs = α + β.xijs + γ.zjs + δs.θs + δWB.WBdummy
+δ52.52dummy + β52.(52dummy ∗ xijs) + γ52.(52dummy ∗ zjs)
+δ52WB.(52dummy ∗ WBdummy) + εijs
.... (2)
Recall that i here indexes an individual child, j the corresponding household, and s the
particular state the child belongs to. So yijs refers to the schooling indicator for the ith child in
the jth household in the sth state. As earlier, xijs are the individual controls while zjs are the
household-level variables - I use the same controls as in the identiﬁcation regressions. The sample
consists of children aged 12-16 (or of children attending primary grades in school, see later). Note
that all children in my sample from the 42nd round were unaﬀected by the program, whereas
children from West Bengal in my sample from the 52nd round were aﬀected. WBdummy is a
dummy for West Bengal. 52dummy is a dummy for the 52nd round, taking the value of 1 for
19 There were also some pro-worker reforms undertaken by the Left Front government after it came to power.
Besley and Burgess (2004) argue that pro-worker labor market regulations in India, including West Bengal, have been
associated with lower levels of manufacturing activity. However, this is unlikely to signiﬁcantly aﬀect educational
attainment, particularly at the primary level. One might be concerned that lower levels of manufacturing might
aﬀect the returns to education, but demand for a good education, particularly with strong English language skills,
was high in West Bengal during this period, as evidenced by the anecdotal reports cited in section 5.6.
16observations from the 52nd round and 0 for observations from the 42nd round. The 52nd round
dummy captures any secular change during this period that was common to all the states. The
seventh and eighth terms on the RHS are the interaction terms between the control variables and
the 52nd round dummy, included to allow for the fact that the eﬀect of these controls may have
changed between the two rounds. The main variable of interest is δ52WB, the coeﬃcient on the
52nd round dummy interacted with the West Bengal dummy. This captures any diﬀerential change
in West Bengal due to the program, and gives the eﬀect of the program on educational outcomes
in West Bengal relative to the 5 control states and in comparison to the pre-program period.
A signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for δ52WB will imply that the abolition of English aﬀected educational
outcomes in post-abolition West Bengal, which thereby followed a diﬀerent path from that of the
control states.
As earlier, I run separate regressions for the rural and the urban sectors (NSS surveys are
stratiﬁed by sector). In each sector, I run a separate regression for the girls. Moreover, as brieﬂy
discussed earlier, it is likely that the eﬀects of the abolition of English will vary by household eco-
nomic status. To see whether this has indeed been the case, I divide the population into quartiles
in terms of per capita household expenditure and then run the above regressions separately for
each expenditure quartile. Within each quartile, I run a separate regression for the girls.
The diﬀerent schooling indicators I include in my analysis as dependent variables are as follows.
School enrollment
The ﬁrst variable I look at is enrollment in school. Male enrollment in West Bengal and most
of the other Indian states was relatively high by the early ‘80s, but female enrollment was still
lagging behind. Equation (2) is run on yijs, a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the ith
child (of jth household in sth state) ever enrolled in a school, zero otherwise. I run both probit
and OLS (linear probability) regressions. I report only the OLS results - the probit results are
very similar to the OLS results and are available on request.
The sample consists of children aged 12-16 years. I compare school enrollment of children
who were not aﬀected by the abolition with school enrollment of children who in West Bengal
were aﬀected by the abolition. The data on the former set of children come from the 42nd round
of the NSS survey, canvassed in 1986-87, while data on the latter set of children come from
the 52nd round of the NSS survey, canvassed in 1995-96. Since I use a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
17estimation strategy, this analysis will show whether children in West Bengal who were aﬀected
by the abolition of English witnessed any diﬀerential growth in enrollment compared to same-
aged children from the same cohort in the other states, after controlling for initial pre-program
diﬀerences, if any.
I use the age-group 12-16 years for the following reasons. First, almost all children in India
move on to middle school by the time they are 12 years old (if they ever enrolled and did not
drop out earlier), so a cutoﬀ at 12 years enables me to analyze their primary schooling outcomes.
Second, as mentioned earlier, children who were more than 12 years old during the 42nd round
of the NSS survey, which was canvassed between July 1986 and June 1987, would have attended
grade 1 before 1983 and hence would be unaﬀected by the no-English policy. This helps me in
constructing my control group for the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimation. Third, I use a cutoﬀ of
16 years since some children over 16 years old, particularly rural girls, have already been married
oﬀ and hence diﬃcult to relate to their parents’ families from the survey, which I need to do
in order to control for parental education and household expenditures in my regressions. Also,
children more than 16 years old during the NSS 52nd round survey in 1995-96 may have been
unaﬀected by the no-English policy in West Bengal, while those less than 16 years old would have
been aﬀected. So a cutoﬀ at 16 years helps me in constructing my treatment group.
Number of Years of Schooling
Given enrollment in school, the most important indicator of educational attainment is the
number of years of schooling attained. In 1983, when the teaching of English was abolished in
West Bengal, schooling in India, including West Bengal, was characterized by high dropout rates,
particularly in the primary and post-primary grades. So the eﬀect of the policy on total schooling
attained will be a key determinant of its success or otherwise.
The dependent variable is the number of years of schooling that a child has attained. The
regression is run on children who ever enrolled in a school. The same regression (equation (2))
is run, except that here I add the age at entry to school as an additional regressor. This is to
control for the fact that children who started school at an earlier age will have had more years of
schooling by the survey date, ceteris paribus (if they are still enrolled). The sample used is the
same as that for school enrollment - children aged 12-16 years.
Private school attendance
18Next I look at the choice between private and public schools. Public schools, ﬁnanced wholly
or mostly by the state government, are bound to implement the no-English policy in the primary
grades. But the private schools would be relatively free from such constraints - and one might
expect some public school students to switch to private schools if employers or parents (or the
students themselves) put a premium on better English language skills. However, since most new
private schools have to be approved by a state board of education, whose members are appointed
by the state government, the supply of new private schools may not always increase in proportion
to the demand for them. Under such circumstances, families may opt for private tutoring as
discussed below.
I deﬁne a binary variable which takes the value 1 if the child in question attends a private
school, 0 otherwise. The same regressions are run, but with two changes. The ﬁrst is that instead
of looking at the 12-16 age cohorts across the two surveys as earlier, I now look at the children
currently studying in primary grades (5th grade or below). That is, I compare the private school
attendance rates of children studying in primary grades during 1995-96 in West Bengal, who were
aﬀected by the abolition of English, with private school attendance rates of children studying in
primary grades during the same year in the other states, after controlling for initial diﬀerences
using data on primary grade children from 1986-87. This is necessary because in the data I only
observe the type of school currently attended - I do not know the type of schools attended by
children in earlier levels or grades. That is, I do not know whether children aged 12-16 years at
the time of the surveys, who are now (at the time of the surveys) studying in middle schools or
secondary schools or have dropped out, attended public or private schools in earlier years when
they were studying in primary grades.20 The second change is that instead of age I now put in
the variable denoting the grade being currently attended as a regressor, as it may better reﬂect
the demand for private schooling.21
20 I ran my earlier regressions with this alternate deﬁnition of the sample - children studying in primary grades
instead of children aged 12-16 years - the results are similar and hence not reported. I slightly prefer looking at
children aged 12-16 years for two reasons. First, restricting the sample to children currently (at the time of the
survey) enrolled in primary grades raises the question of selection bias, as the abolition of English may have had
eﬀects on dropout behavior in West Bengal. Second, some children in the control group enrolled in primary grades
at the time of the 42nd round in 1986-87 can have been partly aﬀected by the abolition in West Bengal, which
began from 1983. So this strategy might give a slight under-estimate of the program eﬀects (most of the eﬀects are
likely to occur only with a lag, as students and families come to terms with the implications of the abolition).
21 Note that this variable - private school attendance - is observed only for students who are currently enrolled,
so there is a selection issue involved here (children dropping out are unlikely to be a random sample of the overall
19Expenditure on coaching
The last two variables of interest concern the expenditure on private coaching. There are
several reasons why one may expect higher expenditures on private coaching in West Bengal
following the abolition of teaching of English, if there is an inherent demand for better English
language skills, at least from some families. One reason is if private schools are slow to respond,
so that the number of seats in private schools falls short of the demand for them. Private coaching
here may be an alternative to acquire the extra skills private schooling might have imparted. Also,
for parents not prepared to switch all the way to private schools (high fees, greater distances from
home, etc.), such coaching may enable incremental increases in desired skills.
I deﬁne two variables. The ﬁrst relates to the probability of a student availing of private
coaching, while the second measures the amount of money spent by a family on its child for such
coaching. The former is a binary indicator taking the value of 1 for a student if any positive
amounts, however small, were spent on her for private coaching. The second variable measures
the amount of such expenditures on the child. The two measures complement each other, and
help us in distinguishing whether any increase in overall coaching expenditures is due to more
families buying private coaching, or individual families increasing their spending.
For each of these two private coaching variables, I run the same regressions as those for private
school attendance, with a small change. The type of school attended - private or public - is now
introduced as an additional regressor, since their respective eﬀects on private coaching may be
diﬀerent. Note that the second variable - total expenditure on private coaching - is a censored
variable - having a value of zero for all those who decide not to avail of any extra at-home
coaching.22
population). If there were variables that inﬂuence dropout, but otherwise are independent of type of school or
expenses when enrolled, one could use them as exclusion restrictions and correct for the non-random selection. In
the absence of such variables, I estimated regressions which include polynomials of the predicted values from the
selection (current school enrollment) equation. The results are very similar and available on request.
22 Though expenditure on coaching is a censored variable (censored at zero), I run simple OLS regressions. I also
run tobit regressions,- however, Deaton (1997) argues that tobit models can give misleading results in the presence
of heteroscedasticity. Heteroscedasticity is indeed a problem in my case, as even among the richer households, there
are many children without any coaching expenditures (or little, if any). The tobit results, which are qualitatively
similar, are available on request.
205 Results
This section describes the results. I run separate regressions for the rural and the urban sectors,
and within each sector I run separate regressions for girls. I also run these regressions separately
for each of the four expenditure quartiles.23
5.1 Enrollment
The results are in Table 4. At the time of the no-English policy, West Bengal lagged slightly behind
the other states, as shown by the coeﬃcients on West Bengal dummy,- however, the diﬀerences are
not signiﬁcant in most cases. The coeﬃcients on the 52nd round dummy are positive but small
and insigniﬁcant, suggesting that there was little trend in school enrollment during this period
independent of the eﬀects of other independent variables. The no-English policy does not seem to
have aﬀected school enrollment in West Bengal any diﬀerently compared to the other states, the
coeﬃcients on West Bengal dummy interacted with the 52nd round dummy are all small, close
to zero and never statistically signiﬁcant.
The coeﬃcients on the other variables have the usual signs. Being female has a strong negative
eﬀect on school enrollment, and the eﬀect is signiﬁcantly higher in the rural sector, highlighting the
low enrollment rates of girls in that sector. Income, proxied by per capita household expenditure,
has a strong positive inﬂuence, particularly in the rural sector, and for girls in that sector. A
child’s age in itself does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect in any of the regressions. In the rural sector,
being a sibling (brother or sister) of the head of the household has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect
on enrollment (compared to being the son or the daughter). Children belonging to the scheduled
castes and scheduled tribes have a signiﬁcantly lower probability of enrolling in school - the eﬀects
are higher for children belonging to scheduled tribes, for girls and in the rural sector.24
23 For enrollment and private school attendance, there are few signiﬁcant diﬀerential eﬀects across expenditure
quartiles. These results are not shown but available on request.
24 For brevity I do not show the coeﬃcients on the dummies for diﬀerent levels of parental education (and
household expenditure squared) - these have the expected signs. I also do not report the coeﬃcients on the
interactions of the explanatory variables with the 52nd round dummy. These results are available on request.
215.2 Number of Years of Schooling
Though there does not seem to have been any positive eﬀect of the no-English policy on school
enrollment, the results in Table 5 on number of years of schooling show signiﬁcant though modest
improvements by children in West Bengal following the abolition. Before the policy was imple-
mented, West Bengal lagged behind the other states in my control group, in both the rural and
the urban sectors, and both for all children and for girls. However, between the 42nd and the
52nd rounds, children in West Bengal signiﬁcantly narrowed the gap between them and their
peers from other states. The improvement was larger for the boys in the urban sector, but in
the rural sector the girls improved at a faster rate, as seen from a comparison of the coeﬃcients
on all children and the coeﬃcients on girls. Note that these improvements were over and above
the overall improvements common to these states during this period, when the average number of
years of schooling for children in this age-group (12-16) increased by about one and a half years
in both the urban and the rural sectors.
Like for enrollment, being female has a strong negative eﬀect on years of schooling attained,
and this is more pronounced in the rural sector. A child’s age at entry to school is also signiﬁcantly
negatively correlated with years of schooling. Unlike for enrollment, relationship to the head of
the household does not seem to have much eﬀect. The results suggest that children belonging to
the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in the rural sector complete a lower number of years
at school, though the coeﬃcients are generally small and not signiﬁcant. Like for enrollment,
household expenditure is a strong positive indicator of school attainment, particularly for girls in
the rural sector.
5.3 Private School Attendance Rates
Recall the discussion in section 2 that if families continue to value English-language skills and
believe that development of such skills will be impaired if schools teach English only from grade 6,
they might switch to private schools, which are not bound by the no-English policy, and/or private
coaching at home. The results for enrollment in private schools are shown in Table 6. Before
the no-English policy, West Bengal had a somewhat higher percentage of its students enrolled
in private schools, more so in the rural sector. However, after the abolition, there is not much
diﬀerential change in either sector compared to other states.
22Interestingly, the female dummy is not signiﬁcant in the regression for all children, suggesting
that there is no diﬀerence among boys and girls in terms of attending private schools, as long as
they are currently enrolled. Unlike for enrollment and school attainment, most other variables do
not have any signiﬁcant eﬀect, except for household expenditure which positively aﬀects private
school attendance in the urban sector, and belonging to scheduled tribes which negatively aﬀects
such attendance. It is also interesting that household expenditure does not matter when it comes
to enrolling children in private schools in the rural sector - it is possible that the rural regions are
supply-constrained as far as private schools are concerned.
5.4 Probability of a Student using Private Coaching
The results for the probability of a student using private coaching at home are in Table 7. Com-
pared to the other states, a higher fraction of West Bengal families was hiring private tutors for
their children at the time of the no-English policy. This was true for both the rural and the urban
sectors, and for both all children as well as for girls (though the incidence was somewhat smaller
in the rural sector and slightly smaller for girls compared to overall).
During the period between the two rounds, there was little overall change across the states.
This is true for either sector,- though the coeﬃcients for the urban sector are positive they are not
signiﬁcant. But interestingly, as far as West Bengal is concerned, there is a signiﬁcant increase
in the percentage of students availing of private coaching. The eﬀect is particularly large in the
urban sector, where the incidence of private coaching signiﬁcantly increased - by 16-17 percentage
points - for both all children and for girls. The increase is also signiﬁcant in the rural sector, but
only for all children, and is relatively modest.
Not surprisingly, among the other explanatory variables, household expenditure has the most
eﬀect on the probability of a student having private tutors, both for all children and girls. Most
other variables are either insigniﬁcant or only marginally signiﬁcant, except the current grade
of the child - possibly a proxy for the fact that as one moves into higher grades, the curriculum
becomes more diversiﬁed and demanding, with a corresponding increase in the demand for private
coaching.
235.5 Total Expenditure on Coaching
The results for the amount of money spent on private coaching mirror those for the share of
students availing of such coaching. Table 8 shows that at the time of the abolition, households in
West Bengal were already spending larger sums of money on private coaching compared to their
counterparts from other states, particularly in the urban sector. There were no overall trends in
private coaching across the control states during this time period, as seen by small and statistically
insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients on the 52nd round dummy.
Interestingly, the expenses on private coaching increased signiﬁcantly in West Bengal after the
no-English policy. In the urban sector, the average amount spent on private tutors increased by
$132 for all children, and by $152 for girls. The increases are much more modest in the rural
sector, though even here the diﬀerences from other states are signiﬁcant, both for all children and
for girls.
Like in Table 7, household expenditure has the largest eﬀect on total expenses on private
coaching. The current grade of the child and private school attendance also positively aﬀect the
expenses, mirroring earlier results on number of students using private coaching. It is interesting
to note that the gradients for these are generally much higher in the urban sector compared to
the rural sector - e.g., the increase in expenditure on private coaching in the rural areas following
the same increase in household expenditure is less than half of that in urban areas. One possible
reason for this may be the lack of an adequate number of tutors or tutoring facilities in the rural
sector compared to the urban sector.
5.6 Discussion
To sum, the results suggest that there was some improvement in school attainment in West Bengal
in the post-abolition period, as measured in terms of years of schooling attained, though this was
not accompanied by any signiﬁcant changes in enrollment. Simultaneously, however, there were
large increases in the number of students availing of private coaching as well as the money spent
on such coaching, as parents in West Bengal presumably sought to supplement the skills of their
children by hiring private tutors. Given the signiﬁcant importance of English language skills in
the labor market and otherwise, parents may have been increasingly inclined to supplement the
24skills that their kids learn at the local schools.25 There were no signiﬁcant changes in private
school attendance, though given the possibility of supply-side bottlenecks it is likely that some of
the increases in private coaching reﬂect pent-up demand for private schools.
Experience of households belonging to diﬀerent expenditure quartiles
One important feature concerning these changes - increases in the number of years of schooling
and in usage and expenditure on private coaching - is the divergence in the experience of children
belonging to diﬀerent quartiles (in terms of household expenditure). Table 9 shows the results for
educational attainment disaggregated by expenditure quartiles. The top panel (Panel A) shows
the results for the urban sector, the bottom panel (Panel B) for the rural sector,- columns (1)
and (6) include all expenditure quartiles, while columns (2)-(5) and columns (7)-(10) are for the
four individual quartiles.26 As is evident, most of the gains in educational attainment accrued
to children from the bottom expenditure quartiles. This is true for both the sectors (though the
eﬀects are not statistically signiﬁcant in the urban sector), and for both all children and for girls,
but particularly for the rural sector. For example, children belonging to the poorest expenditure
quartile in the rural sector witnessed an increase of 0.67 years of schooling,- the increase (1.00)
being even larger for girls (columns (2) and (7) respectively). Conversely, children belonging to
the richest expenditure quartile in West Bengal actually saw some relative decline, though this is
not always statistically signiﬁcant (columns (5) and (10) respectively).
Tables 10 and 11 show the results for private coaching. The results for the urban sector are
given in Table 10. The top panel shows the results for the probability of a student using private
coaching. As is evident, the no-English policy seems to have aﬀected households in diﬀerent
quartiles diﬀerently. There is no evidence of any signiﬁcant increase in the probability of a child
using private coaching in West Bengal as far as the poorest quartile is concerned, either for
all children or for the girls. On the other hand, there are signiﬁcant increases by households
belonging to the two middle quartiles, particularly by households belonging to the third (upper
25 Recall that the comparative statics exercise of the model in section 2 predicted that one should expect higher
private spending on education in case of a decline in educational standards at school.
26 Columns (1)-(5) include both boys and girls, while columns (6)-(10) show the results for the girls. Columns
(1) and (6) include all expenditure quartiles (results reproduced from earlier tables), columns (2) and (7) are for
children belonging to the poorest expenditure quartile, columns (3) and (8) are for children belonging to the lower
middle expenditure quartile, columns (4) and (9) are for children belonging to the upper middle expenditure quartile
and columns (5) and (10) are for children belonging to the richest (top) expenditure quartile.
25middle) quartile. There are no signiﬁcant increases for children in the top quartile.
The results for the amounts of money spent on private coaching - shown in the bottom panel
of Table 10 - are even more striking. Spending on such coaching by families in West Bengal rose
very signiﬁcantly after the no-English policy. What is perhaps equally important, the increases
were not equally spread across the expenditure quartiles. In the bottom quartile, the increases
in private coaching were small and statistically insigniﬁcant. But the increases were large and
substantial in each of the other three quartiles, although the increase in the top quartile was not
signiﬁcant for girls.
Table 11 shows the results for the rural sector. These are similar to the results for urban
sector,- however, the increases, both in the probability of a child using private coaching and the
total expenditures on such coaching, were lower compared to the urban sector (and not always
statistically signiﬁcant). There is still a hierarchy across the expenditure quartiles, though. This
is particularly true for expenditure on private coaching, where there actually was a decrease in the
poorest quartile but signiﬁcant increases in all the other quartiles (the largest increases coming
in the top quartile).
These results suggest that the no-English policy aﬀected diﬀerent children diﬀerently - while
there were signiﬁcant improvements for poorer children in school attainment, they may have
suﬀered relatively in not being able to avail of private tutoring at the same rate as their peers
from the richer families. It is possible that the private coaching the more aﬄuent families were
purchasing would have its eﬀects later in life - this might create or widen the gap (in subsequent
educational attainment or labor market outcomes) between the diﬀerent groups in the future.
There is also some anecdotal evidence in favor of private tutoring. For example, Guha
Thakurta (1998) writes about the mushrooming growth of private institutions oﬀering courses
in English from primary level and/or ‘spoken English’ classrooms. Further, there was also a
“mad rush” for admission in English medium schools - schools where the medium (language) of
instruction was English.
Overall, the analysis suggests that the results of the abolition of teaching of English were
mixed. There were some signiﬁcant improvements in school attainment following the policy, and
this was accompanied by signiﬁcant increases in private coaching, as parents in West Bengal sought
to supplement the education of their children by hiring private tutors. Also, the no-English policy
26did not have any eﬀect on enrollment, and this suggests that schooling outcomes in the primary
level in West Bengal were also dependent on factors other than the compulsory study of English.
Possible such factors, as often mentioned in journalistic accounts and in popular media, include
teacher absenteeism, lack of adequate infrastructure, etc.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I study the eﬀects of an important educational intervention in West Bengal, a state
in eastern India. In 1983, the government of West Bengal abolished the teaching of English from
primary schools. I argue that this intervention may be expected to improve educational outcomes
for students who were earlier struggling with the curriculum, and improve their educational at-
tainment. However, it may also have some unintended eﬀects. Aware of the beneﬁts of a good
knowledge of English in the labor market and in private life, which is likely to be compromised
by this policy, families may spend private resources to acquire such skills. This may, somewhat
ironically, widen the gap between the poor on the one hand and the rich and the middle-class on
the other, something the program was ostensibly designed to narrow.
The results are somewhat intriguing. Though there does not seem to have been much beneﬁcial
eﬀect of the no-English policy on school enrollment, there has been a signiﬁcant increase in
educational attainment, as measured by years of schooling. This is true for both the rural and
the urban sectors, though for girls in the urban sector the eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant.
What is perhaps more important, the results suggest that children from the poorer families, as
measured by household expenditures, witnessed larger relative improvements in school attainment
than their peers from the richer families. In as much as a key objective of the policy was to
improve educational attainment for the disadvantaged sections of the society, it can be deemed
partly successful. However, one important consequence of the policy in West Bengal was the
steep rise in the incidence of private coaching. As Tables 7 and 8 show, many more parents in
West Bengal were hiring private tutors for their children, and they also signiﬁcantly increased the
amount of money they were spending on such tutoring. Not surprisingly, the largest increases
were often in the richest quartiles, particularly for the amount of expenditure on private coaching.
This suggests that well-to-do parents were increasingly supplementing the education that their
children got at school by private purchases (hiring tutors at home). It is an intriguing result
27of a program aimed at improving the educational attainment of the poorer and disadvantaged
students. The anecdotal evidence referred to earlier - mushrooming growth of private institutions
oﬀering courses in English, and of institutes oﬀering spoken English courses - describes the same
phenomenon.
As mentioned earlier, one important eﬀect of the abolition of teaching of English should be
lower English language skills, with its attendant negative labor market implications. However,
counteracting this eﬀect would be better employment and job prospects because of higher educa-
tional attainment, particularly for students from poor and lower middle-income families. Because
it is too early - the cohorts aﬀected by the no-English policy would have barely entered the labor
force at the time of the latest survey available - I have not been able to look at wages and other
employment outcomes of the abolition. In future work it would be interesting to see whether
the positive eﬀects of the no-English policy on years of schooling were able to negate the adverse
eﬀects on lower English language skills.
Appendix: Operation Blackboard
In 1986, only about 62% of rural boys and 40% of rural girls aged 6 to 14 were enrolled
in school in India (Chin, 2005). In 1987, the government of India launched a major all-India
program called Operation Blackboard (OB) to tackle this problem of low achievement. OB was
aimed at substantial improvements in school quality. It tried to provide a second teacher to all
single-teacher schools, a second classroom to all single-classroom schools and a teaching-learning
equipment packet to all schools.
However, the general perception about OB is that it has not been a success. For example,
Caroline Dyer, who has extensively studied OB, argues that “it is widely perceived to be an
expensive failure. In terms of achieving its intention of establishing a minimum norm of essential
facilities for primary schools, it was largely unsuccessful” (Dyer, 2001). Chin (2005), who examines
the eﬀects of the teacher recruitment drive, comes to a similar conclusion for the urban areas where
the increase in number of teachers per 1000 children was only 0.16 (less than 1%). For the rural
areas (where the increase in teachers was 2.16 per 1000 children) Chin does ﬁnd some positive
eﬀects. But even then, the positive eﬀects were concentrated only among the girls.
Operation Blackboard did not aﬀect all states equally - in terms of classrooms built and
28teachers recruited, there was some inter-state variation.27 These inter-state diﬀerences in imple-
mentation might have been a potential problem if the program were successful, which was not
the case. Further, the set of control states in my case is large and varied enough to eliminate
(or at least dampen) any bias that might creep in from a signiﬁcant impact of OB in one or two
states. For example, I do not ﬁnd any systematic diﬀerences in the evolution of the schooling
indicators in states like Orissa (and Karnataka), which seem to have done better than the others
in implementing OB. Also, OB seems to be in a position to make a diﬀerence only in the rural
regions (Chin (2005), see above) but the abolition of English in West Bengal aﬀected both rural
and urban populations, and most of the eﬀects obtained above are found in both the urban and
rural areas, not only the rural areas (though there are some diﬀerences in magnitude).
Finally, one thing to note is that even though the central government spent huge sums on
OB, OB expenditures were low relative to total expenditures on elementary education. State
governments are responsible for most of the costs of school education, and they account for over
95% of the total spending on elementary education. This may help somewhat in understanding
the modest impact of even such a large undertaking as OB.
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31Table 1: Percentage of Primary-grade Children enrolled in English-medium Schools,
by Expenditure Quartiles
(Selected Indian States, Urban Areas, 1995-96)
Bottom Lower Upper Top
(Poorest) Middle Middle (Richest)
Quartile Quartile Quartile Quartile
Assam 1 9 24 59
Gujarat 1 5 8 36
Haryana 1 14 18 45
Karnataka 5 21 47 78
Orissa 2 5 32 74
West Bengal 1 4 14 39
Source: Author’s calculations from NSS 52nd round survey, 1995-96.Table 2: Identiﬁcation Regressions, Enrollment in School
(Selected Coeﬃcients from OLS regressions
All Children Female Children
Age during NSS 42nd round Age during NSS 42nd round
survey (1986-87) survey (1986-87)
12-13 14-16 17-18 12-13 14-16 17-18
Regressions for Urban Sector
Assam 0.04+ 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.09+
Gujarat 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.06+ 0.04
Haryana 0.06 0.05 -0.01 0.10+ 0.04 0.06
Karnataka -0.02 0.00 -0.04 0.05 0.04 -0.04
Orissa -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.00 0.04
Observations 9844 8864 7856 4606 4045 3423
R-squared 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.27 0.26 0.24
Regressions for Rural Sector
Assam 0.06∗ 0.06∗ 0.06∗ 0.07+ 0.05 0.05
Gujarat 0.08∗∗ 0.06∗ 0.08∗ 0.05 -0.01 0.01
Haryana 0.10∗ 0.03 0.04 -0.05 -0.08 -0.06
Karnataka 0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
Orissa 0.00 0.00 0.03 -0.06 -0.10∗ -0.02
Observations 20229 17148 13084 8233 6644 4531
R-squared 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.28 0.30 0.32
Notes: The dependent variable is whether a child ever enrolled in a school - it is a 0-1 binary variable taking the value
of 1 if the child ever enrolled, 0 otherwise. The coeﬃcients shown here are for the dummy variables for the diﬀerent
Indian states - these take the value of 1 if the child is a resident of the particular state, 0 otherwise. West Bengal is
the omitted category. (There are 17 Indian states included in the regression analysis, I only report coeﬃcients on
those states which will form my control group - see text for details.) The regressions also include age and sex of the
child, a dummy for whether the child is a brother or sister of the head of the household, a dummy for whether the
child is a grandchild of the head of the household, per capita expenditure of the household, per capita expenditure
squared, dummies for diﬀerent levels of parental education, a dummy for whether the household is headed by a
female, and dummies for belonging to the scheduled castes or the scheduled tribes. All regressions are weighted and
clustered according to the sample design. +, ∗, ∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. I also ran
the corresponding probit regressions, the results are similar and hence not reported.Table 3: Socioeconomic Indicators across Selected Indian States, 1986-87
(Households with Children in Primary Grades)
Per Capita Expenditures Percentage of Percentage Rank among
Mean (in Rupees) Disadvantaged Groups of Parents Indian States
(Scheduled Castes and who are in HDI1 in 1981
Scheduled Tribes) Literate (1991, 2001)
Assam 112 19.45 44.94 9 (10, 14)
Gujarat 113 27.75 38.95 4 (6, 6)
Haryana 136 26.53 37.57 5 (5, 5)
Karnataka 100 19.04 50.60 6 (7, 7)
Orissa 100 29.52 41.01 10 (11, 11)
West Bengal 115 30.56 40.78 8 (8, 8)
Source: The human development index ﬁgures are from the Planning Commission of India’s National
Human Development Report (2002). All other numbers are from author’s calculations from NSS 42nd
round data, 1986-87.
1 HDI stands for Human Development Index. This is calculated by the Planning Commission of In-
dia and looks at eight diﬀerent dimensions of development performance: per capita expenditure, headcount
poverty rate, literacy rate, a formal education enrollment index, infant mortality, life expectancy, access to
safe water, and access to housing constructed with relatively permanent materials.Table 4: Eﬀect of the Abolition of English on Enrollment in School, OLS regressions
(Children aged 12-16 years)
Urban Sector Rural Sector
All Children Female Children All Children Female Children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -0.06∗∗ -0.13∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
Age 0.01 0.01+ 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Sibling of head of household -0.04 -0.12+ -0.10∗∗ -0.13∗∗
(0.03) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
Grandchild of head of household 0.01 0.05 0.12∗∗ 0.16∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
(Real) Per capita expenditure 0.04∗∗ 0.04∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.23∗∗
(in ’00 Rs) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03)
Belonging to female-headed hh -0.07∗ -0.09∗ -0.04 0.00
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Belonging to Scheduled Caste -0.06∗ -0.09∗ -0.09∗∗ -0.13∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03)
Belonging to Scheduled Tribe -0.12+ 0.02 -0.18∗∗ -0.17∗∗
(0.07) (0.09) (0.03) (0.04)
West Bengal -0.02 -0.04+ -0.04∗ 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
52nd round 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.02
(0.10) (0.14) (0.11) (0.16)
West Bengal * 52nd round -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.04
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Observations 8188 3802 15593 6666
R-squared 0.14 0.18 0.19 0.23
Notes: The dependent variable is a 0-1 binary variable, taking the value of 1 if the child in question ever enrolled in a school. West
Bengal is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the child lived in West Bengal, 0 otherwise. 52nd round is a dummy variable for
the 52nd round of the NSS, conducted during 1995-96, which gives the post-program eﬀects. (The no-English policy in West Bengal
was implemented in 1983, see text for details.) All regressions also include dummies for diﬀerent levels of parental education, per
capita expenditure squared and interactions of the explanatory variables with the 52nd round dummy. All regressions are weighted
and clustered according to the sample design. +, ∗, ∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.Table 5: Eﬀect of the Abolition of English on Number of Years of Schooling, OLS regressions
(Children aged 12-16 years)
Urban Sector Rural Sector
All Children Female Children All Children Female Children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -0.16+ -0.32∗∗
(0.10) (0.07)
Age 0.67∗∗ 0.64∗∗ 0.62∗∗ 0.59∗∗
(0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)
Age at entry to school -0.09∗∗ -0.08∗∗ -0.07∗ -0.04
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
Sibling of head of household -0.07 -0.26 0.08 0.05
(0.19) (0.36) (0.16) (0.27)
Grandchild of head of household 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.17
(0.20) (0.22) (0.15) (0.20)
(Real) Per capita expenditure 0.57∗∗ 0.51∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.82∗∗
(0.07) (0.09) (0.11) (0.14)
Belonging to female-headed hh -0.12 0.19 -0.09 0.05
(0.15) (0.23) (0.15) (0.21)
Belonging to Scheduled Caste -0.09 -0.09 -0.23∗ -0.09
(0.18) (0.27) (0.10) (0.15)
Belonging to Scheduled Tribe 0.08 0.07 -0.16 -0.20
(0.26) (0.24) (0.12) (0.20)
West Bengal -0.75∗∗ -0.73∗∗ -0.65∗∗ -0.77∗∗
(0.13) (0.18) (0.09) (0.12)
52nd round 1.68∗ 1.55 1.27∗ 1.72∗
(0.66) (0.97) (0.58) (0.81)
West Bengal * 52nd round 0.30∗ 0.21 0.20+ 0.35∗
(0.16) (0.21) (0.12) (0.17)
Observations 7495 3410 12603 4924
R-squared 0.47 0.46 0.44 0.43
Notes: The dependent variable is the number of years of schooling attained. West Bengal is a dummy variable taking the value
of 1 if the child lived in West Bengal, 0 otherwise. 52nd round is a dummy variable for the 52nd round of the NSS, conducted
during 1995-96, which gives the post-program eﬀects. (The no-English policy in West Bengal was implemented in 1983, see text
for details.) All regressions also include dummies for diﬀerent levels of parental education, per capita expenditure squared and
interactions of the explanatory variables with the 52nd round dummy. All regressions are weighted and clustered according to the
sample design. +, ∗, ∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.Table 6: Eﬀect of the Abolition of English on Enrollment in Private Schools, OLS regressions
(Children enrolled in Primary School)
Urban Sector Rural Sector
All Children Female Children All Children Female Children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.01)
Age 0.00 0.01 0.01∗∗ 0.02∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Sibling of head of household 0.03 0.05 -0.02 0.05
(0.07) (0.12) 0.00 (0.06)
Grandchild of head of household 0.06 -0.04 0.00 -0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02)
(Real) Per capita expenditure 0.14∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.00 0.02
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Belonging to female-headed hh -0.04 0.05 0.01 0.00
(0.05) (0.08) (0.02) (0.03)
Belonging to Scheduled Caste -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
Belonging to Scheduled Tribe -0.03 -0.16∗∗ -0.05∗∗ -0.05∗∗
(0.10) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02)
West Bengal 0.07 0.08 0.12∗∗ 0.12∗∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
52nd round 0.13 0.04 -0.13+/∗ -0.08
(0.12) (0.14) (0.07) (0.08)
West Bengal * 52nd round -0.06 -0.09 0.00 -0.01
(0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03)
Observations 7998 3723 13542 5839
R-squared 0.14 0.17 0.09 0.09
Notes: The dependent variable is a 0-1 binary variable, taking the value of 1 if the child in question is enrolled in a private
school. West Bengal is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the child lived in West Bengal, 0 otherwise. 52nd round is a
dummy variable for the 52nd round of the NSS, conducted during 1995-96, which gives the post-program eﬀects. (The no-English
policy in West Bengal was implemented in 1983, see text for details.) All regressions also include dummies for diﬀerent levels of
parental education, per capita expenditure squared and interactions of the explanatory variables with the 52nd round dummy. All
regressions are weighted and clustered according to the sample design. +, ∗, ∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent
levels.Table 7: Eﬀect of the Abolition of English on Number of Students using Private Coaching, OLS regressions
(Children enrolled in Primary School)
Urban Sector Rural Sector
All Children Female Children All Children Female Children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -0.03+ -0.01
(0.02) (0.01)
Grade at school 0.03∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.02∗∗
(0.01) (0.1) (0.00) (0.01)
Attending a private school 0.06+ 0.03 0.03 0.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Sibling of head of household 0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.06+
(0.06) (0.09) (0.03) (0.04)
Grandchild of head of household 0.05 0.02 0.04∗ 0.03
(0.06) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)
(Real) Per capita expenditure 0.07∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.10∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Belonging to female-headed hh 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.05
(0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
Belonging to Scheduled Caste 0.02 0.04 0.01 -0.01
(0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
Belonging to Scheduled Tribe -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.03
(0.05) (0.09) (0.02) (0.03)
West Bengal 0.27∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.21∗∗
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
52nd round 0.09 0.10 0.00 -0.02
(0.10) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11)
West Bengal * 52nd round 0.16∗∗ 0.17∗∗ 0.07∗ 0.05
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Observations 7993 3719 13502 5821
R-squared 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.15
Notes: The dependent variable is a 0-1 binary variable, taking the value of 1 if the child in question received private coaching at
home, 0 otherwise. West Bengal is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the child lived in West Bengal, 0 otherwise. 52nd
round is a dummy variable for the 52nd round of the NSS, conducted during 1995-96, which gives the post-program eﬀects. (The
no-English policy in West Bengal was implemented in 1983, see text for details.) All regressions also include dummies for diﬀerent
levels of parental education, per capita expenditure squared and interactions of the explanatory variables with the 52nd round
dummy. All regressions are weighted and clustered according to the sample design. +, ∗, ∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1
percent levels.Table 8: Eﬀect of the Abolition of English on Expenditure on Private Coaching, OLS regressions
(Children enrolled in Primary School)
Urban Sector Rural Sector
All Children Female Children All Children Female Children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Female -9 -2
(7) (2)
Grade at school 13∗∗ 12∗∗ 5∗∗ 5∗∗
(2) (3) (1) (1)
Attending a private school 24∗ 9 12∗∗ 9+
(10) (13) (5) (5)
Sibling of head of household 5 37 -5 -8
(25) (52) (4) (6)
Grandchild of head of household 27+ 15 7+ 8
(16) (14) (4) (6)
(Real) Per capita expenditure 49∗∗ 64∗∗ 21∗∗ 21∗∗
(12) (20) (4) (5)
Belonging to female-headed hh -6 2 2 1
(12) (15) (4) (5)
Belonging to Scheduled Caste 0 2 -1 0
(7) (9) (3) (4)
Belonging to Scheduled Tribe -8 -10 -3 -2
(11) (17) (2) (2)
West Bengal 79∗∗ 77∗∗ 31∗∗ 28∗∗
(11) (14) (3) (4)
52nd round 7 -9 23 7
(64) (63) (19) (34)
West Bengal * 52nd round 132∗∗ 152∗∗ 25∗∗ 17∗
(25) (37) (6) (8)
Observations 7971 3711 13459 5799
R-squared 0.18 0.25 0.12 0.10
Notes: The dependent variable is the expenditure on private coaching for the child in question. West Bengal is a dummy variable
taking the value of 1 if the child lived in West Bengal, 0 otherwise. 52nd round is a dummy variable for the 52nd round of the
NSS, conducted during 1995-96, which gives the post-program eﬀects. (The no-English policy in West Bengal was implemented in
1983, see text for details.) All regressions also include dummies for diﬀerent levels of parental education, per capita expenditure
squared and interactions of the explanatory variables with the 52nd round dummy. All regressions are weighted and clustered
according to the sample design. +, ∗, ∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.Table 9: Eﬀect of the Abolition of English on Number of Years of Schooling, by Expenditure Quartiles
OLS regressions
(Children aged 12-16 years)
All Children Female Children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Panel A
Urban Sector
52nd round 1.68∗ 0.21 -0.24 2.98 1.43 1.55 -0.19 -0.52 1.27 0.90
(0.66) (1.07) (0.55) (0.68) (1.09) (0.97) (1.95) (1.62) (1.19) (0.92)
West Bengal * 52nd round 0.30∗ 0.48 0.34 0.21 -0.51∗∗ 0.21 0.57 0.44 0.64 -0.58∗
(0.16) (0.34) (0.28) (0.33) (0.19) (0.21) (0.50) (0.33) (0.53) (0.27)
R-squared 0.47 0.36 0.40 0.48 0.62 0.46 0.39 0.44 0.47 0.58
Panel B
Rural Sector
52nd round 1.27∗ 1.10 3.32 2.29+ 0.61 1.72∗ 1.43 1.31 2.32∗∗ 1.86
(0.58) (1.05) (1.04) (1.58) (0.90) (0.81) (1.24) (0.83) (0.80) (1.50)
West Bengal * 52nd round 0.20+ 0.67∗∗ 0.46+ 0.24 -0.31 0.35∗ 1.00∗∗ 0.13 0.42 -0.43+
(0.12) (0.23) (0.28) (0.23) (0.18) (0.17) (0.38) (0.42) (0.32) (0.25)
R-squared 0.44 0.36 0.40 0.43 0.48 0.43 0.31 0.39 0.43 0.52
Notes: See notes to Table 5 for details. Columns (1) and (6) include all expenditure quartiles, columns (2) and (7) are for children
belonging to the poorest expenditure quartile, columns (3) and (8) are for children belonging to the lower middle expenditure quartile,
columns (4) and (9) are for children belonging to the upper middle expenditure quartile and columns (5) and (10) are for children
belonging to the richest (top) expenditure quartile. +, ∗, ∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.Table 10: Eﬀect of the Abolition of English on Private Coaching, by Expenditure Quartiles
Urban Sector, OLS regressions
(Children enrolled in Primary School)
All Children Female Children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent variable:
Whether got Private Coaching
52nd round 0.08 -0.09 -0.07 0.05 0.04 0.10 -0.09 -0.20 0.35 0.08
(0.10) (0.13) (0.08) (0.05) (0.14) (0.11) (0.15) (0.20) (0.11) (0.19)
West Bengal * 52nd round 0.16∗∗ 0.02 0.23∗∗ 0.35∗∗ -0.07 0.17∗∗ 0.07 0.17+ 0.39∗∗ -0.14
(0.04) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10)
R-squared 0.22 0.21 0.27 0.27 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.31 0.23
Dependent variable:
Expenditure on Private Coaching
52nd round 7 -53∗∗ -91∗ 43 36 -9 -18 -60 58 -64
(64) (56) (45) (65) (36) (63) (65) (43) (77) (49)
West Bengal * 52nd round 132∗∗ 21 67∗∗ 211∗∗ 167+ 152∗∗ 21 74∗∗ 222∗∗ 220
(25) (14) (22) (31) (105) (37) (15) (28) (40) (148)
R-squared 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.22 0.16 0.25 0.21 0.27 0.27 0.28
Notes: See notes to Tables 7 and 8 for details. Columns (1) and (6) include all expenditure quartiles, columns (2) and (7) are for
children belonging to the poorest expenditure quartile, columns (3) and (8) are for children belonging to the lower middle expenditure
quartile, columns (4) and (9) are for children belonging to the upper middle expenditure quartile and columns (5) and (10) are for
children belonging to the richest (top) expenditure quartile. +, ∗, ∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.Table 11: Eﬀect of the Abolition of English on Private Coaching, by Expenditure Quartiles
Rural Sector, OLS regressions
(Children enrolled in Primary School)
All Children Female Children
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent variable:
Whether got Private Coaching
52nd round 0.00 -0.37∗ -0.67 0.71 0.22 -0.02 -0.37 -1.29 0.73 -0.13
(0.08) (0.17) (0.70) (0.69) (0.20) (0.11) (0.26) (0.84) (0.98) (0.28)
West Bengal * 52nd round 0.07∗ -0.04 0.10 0.08 0.18∗∗ 0.05 -0.04 0.08 0.11 0.07
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09)
R-squared 0.18 0.12 0.19 0.16 0.24 0.15 0.09 0.19 0.17 0.18
Dependent variable:
Expenditure on Private Coaching
52nd round 23 -24 -90 23 -25 7 -9 -83 -20 -109
(19) (19) (83) (73) (90) (34) (19) (91) (92) (195)
West Bengal * 52nd round 25∗∗ -10∗ 16∗ 20∗ 87∗∗ 17∗ -12+ 15+ 19+ 70∗
(6) (5) (8) (2) (20) (8) (6) (8) (11) (35)
R-squared 0.12 0.10 0.19 0.15 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.21 0.17 0.14
Notes: See notes to Tables 7 and 8 for details. Columns (1) and (6) include all expenditure quartiles, columns (2) and (7) are for
children belonging to the poorest expenditure quartile, columns (3) and (8) are for children belonging to the lower middle expenditure
quartile, columns (4) and (9) are for children belonging to the upper middle expenditure quartile and columns (5) and (10) are for
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